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PATHS TO CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE
FOR MUNICIPALITIES
WALLACE MENDELSON*

'"t is not by the consolidation or concentration of powers, but by their distribution, that good government is effected. Were not this country already
divided into states, that division must be made, that each might do for
itself what concerns itself directly, and what it can so much better do than a
distant authority. Each state again is divided into counties [and municipalities],
each to take care of what lies within its local bounds ....
It is by this partition of cares, descending in gradation from general to particular, that the
mass of human affairs may best be managed for the good and prosperity of all."
-THOMAS

JEFFERSON.

A basic American tradition is that problems which are national in
scope (i.e., which "affect more states than one") shall be handled
by the national government, while problems of merely state-wide
concern are left for state government. Municipal home rule is the application of this basic principal in the relationship of the state to its
towns and cities. To put the matter in the most simple and direct
terms -nothing should be done at the national level that can be
done efficiently by the states and nothing should be handled at the
state level that can be dealt with effectively by the local community.
It is by such subdivision of governmental power and responsibility that
we in America have sought to solve "the inherent difficulty which
[bigness] begets- whether in the government of industry, university
or nation - namely, the task of getting things done, consistently with
that large regard for individual variations which is the essence of
democracy. '
Home rule does not merely free cities from irksome control of
purely local affairs by outsiders. It also relieves the already overburdened state legislature from the time consuming and thankless
task of serving as city council for hundreds of communities whose
special problems it cannot reasonably be expected to comprehend.
In short, home rule benefits both state and local government. It is,
after all, only another aspect of that division of labor which is the
rule of modern life.
But while the principle of local self-government for towns and
cities is clear, experience in some states has shown that it is sometimes difficult to achieve in practice. To come at once to the heart
* Associate Professor of Political Science, The University of Tennessee. The
author desires that the following statement preface his article: "I speak here
for myself alone and not for any group or institution with which I am, or have
been associated."
1. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 68 (1939).
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of the matter- in those states where home rule has failed, failure
has resulted primarily from the attitude of the state courts!
In some instances judges have displayed what can only be described
as hostility toward the idea of home rule. The result has been a gradual whittling away of municipal powers until little or nothing remains
of local self-government.3 For such a situation there is, of course,
no easy or immediate remedy. No form of constitutional language can
be devised to give what a hostile court sees fit to withhold.
Another stumbling block has been not so much a hostile attitude, as
an apparent lack of judicial enthusiasm, an attachment for the old,
customary way of doing things. In fairness to the judges it should be
added that this attitude often has been merely a by-product. of inadequate and poorly drawn constitutional guides.! For problems of
this type there is, of course, a remedy - constitutional provisions that
will supply the judiciary with something more than pious wishes for
their guidance. What follows is an effort to indicate some paths to
this goal. Part I deals with the relatively simple matter of authorizing
municipalities to adopt and amend their own charters. Part II deals
with the far more difficult problem of the allocation of functions as
between the state and the municipality. The first concerns forms of
government; the second the powers of government.
PART I.

THE ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF MUNICIPAL CHARTERS

A primary element of home rule is the provision for adoption or
amendment by each individual municipality of its own city charter.
As a matter of experience, this aspect of home rule has not been the
source of any great difficulty. The chief problem here is to devise a
simple and workable procedure for ascertaining the wishes of the community with respect to its basic governmental organization and machinery. In some cases the state constitution itself provides these
procedures; in others the constitution merely provides that the state
legislature shall by general law supply them. The former may be made
"self-executing" in order to free home rule from possible frustration
by a dilatory or unfriendly state legislature. On the other hand leaving the matter to the legislatures may provide greater flexibility in
the face of experience and changing conditions. As Rodney Mott has
said, "in its zeal to insure local autonomy, regardless of the attitude
2. Compare KNEIER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 85-109 (1947);
McDONALD, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 78-82 (1941);
McGOLDRIcK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930 299351 (1933); 2 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 4.85-4.113 (1949); MOTT,
HOIMnE RULE FOR AMERICA'S CITIES 51-52 (1949); THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STATE-LOCAL
RELATIONS 169-70 (1941).

3. Compare Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice,
9 Omo ST. L.J. 18 (1948); Merrill, Constitutional Home Rule for Cities, Oklahoma Version, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 139 (1952).
4. MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 10.19.
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of the legislature toward it, a state may set up such a cumbersome procedure . . . as to preclude its actual use. If the details of chartermaking are too complex, the citizens may be discouraged from undertaking it. Even if they are courageous enough to make the attempt,
the courts may declare the new [charter or amendment] illegal because
of a failure to conform to some obscure technical point. A prescription
of the details of charter-making may place a city on a procedural
tight rope. The cities need a practical home rule procedure rather than
a theoretical right which it may be difficult to use."' ;
In view of these considerations it would seem desirable to "require"
the state legislature by general law to provide charter-making and
amending procedures and also to provide an alternative, self-executing
procedure in the constitution itself. The latter should be in broad outline form as in the constitutions of Colorado (Constitution, Art. XX,
Sec. 5) and Texas (Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 5). For "the fewer details which can be included and still enable the cities to proceed regardless of legislative inaction, the better.... It is more in accordance
with the spirit of home rule to permit a city to work out its own procedure through the local council or charter commission than to prescribe it by constitutional or legislative fiat."'
The following proposed constitutional provisions have been prepared in the light of these considerations:
SECTION 1:
Provision shall be made by general law, which may provide
optional plans, for the organization and government of municipalities which
do not secure charters in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of this
Article. But no plan or charter of organization and government shall become
operative in any municipality until submitted to the qualified voters thereof
in accordance with the election procedures outlined in Section 2 of this Article
and approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon.

SECTION 2:
Subject only to the Declaration of Rights of this Constitution,
the provisions of this Article' and general laws of the state which [do not
deal with matters of purely or essentially local concern and which] in terms
and effect apply alike to all municipalities, any municipality may adopt or
amend a charter for its own organization and government in the following
manner: upon publication of a proposed charter or charter amendment either
by the legislative body of a municipality or by a charter commission of five
members, chosen in a municipal election pursuant to petition for such election
signed by ten per cent of the qualified voters of a municipality, the municipality shall submit such proposal to its qualified voters at a general or special
election, not later than the first general election which shall be held at least

5. MOTT,op. cit. supra note 2, at 23.
6. Ibid.
7. Some or all of the other provisions of the state constitution
added here. In its present form Section 2 imposes upon municipalities
liberty restraints, those provided in the home rule article itself
others as may be imposed by existing and future general laws of
(dealing with matters not of purely or essentially local concern).

might be
only civil
and such
the state
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sixty days after such publication. Any number of amendments may be so
submitted for approval or disapproval at any election, but each amendment
shall be voted upon separately. Subject to the other provisions of this Article,
proposals submitted in reasonable conformity with the procedures herein outlined shall be immediately effective upon approval by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon.
SECTION 3: Municipalities are hereby authorized to appropriate money and
to make rules and regulations for the conduct of elections authorized by Sections 1 and 2 of this Article.
PART

II.

THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS BETWEEN STATE AND MUNICIPALITY

In those states in which home rule has failed, the stumbling block has
always been the difficulty of locating a line between local and state
affairs. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with disarming
frankness has confessed that, "We find no answer to this [problem] in
any decision of any court in this country."8 In some cases the language
of home rule provisions has been ambiguous! Often the difficulty has
sprung from the inability of human foresight and language to anticipate the problems that time and change present. Sometimes judges
have been hostile, sometimes merely unfriendly. All too frequently
they have been compelled to make decisions without the aid of adequate legislative or constitutional guideposts. To make matters worse
we often want both local autonomy and the uniformity or improved
standards which in practice come most easily from central supervision."0 Finally there are those among us whose enthusiasm switches
back and forth between local and state autonomy according to their
selfish interests or prejudices in each particular case.
A.

The Concurrent Power Approach

To state the problem in the thoroughly orthodox manner in which
it has just been stated assumes that there is a sharp line of demarcation
between state and local affairs and that the difficulty lies in locating
it. But experience teaches that categories distinct at their cores merge
into one another at their peripheries. And matters that are purely local
for some purposes are of state-wide concern for other purposes. Moreover, what concerns only towns and cities today may well have broader
implications tomorrow. For example, as the Supreme Court of California has observed,
"Until the advent of the automobile, interurban traffic was so small as to be
negligible, and, as a result, traffic regulations were a matter of concern only
to the inhabitants of the city. But when autos and motor trucks invaded our
highways and streets in tens and hundreds of thousands, a matter that yester8. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25, 28, affd on rehearing,222 Wis. 58, 268 N.W. 108, 105 A.L.R. 244 (1936).
9. McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 4.85-4.86.
10. McGoLDmic, op. cit. supra note 2, at 101.
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day was local has become of state and nationwide importance today ....
The
term "municipal affairs" is not a fixed quantity but
fluctuates
with
every
11
change in the conditions upon which it is to operate."

Judge Marshall of Missouri put the problem in a nutshell when he
declared "it is extremely unfortunate that this court ever attempted
to solve the problem by drawing a distinction between matters of mere
local concern and matters of state concern ....

[N]o fixed, certain,

general or intelligible rule can be formulated upon such a distinction.
...

[for] There are many matters which are in a sense local but in

which the state at large has a direct interest."1 The fundamental difficulty is that governmental powers cannot be neatly compartmentalized
into national, state and local categories. To expect courts to do so is to
expect the impossible. Judges must be painfully aware that in making
a constitutional decision they are deciding far more than the case immediately before them. When called upon to allocate governmental
powers on an either-or basis they must inevitably favor the larger,
more comprehensive level of government. For those upon whom such
responsibility falls must be constantly aware that there is far greater
danger in depriving a larger, rather than a smaller, unit of government
of any given power. Thus at the very least in cases of doubt or controversy the judicial tendency must be- and quite properly isagainst home rule. This is the curse of a system that assumes any
given power is either national, state or local in essence. In short if the
orthodox demarcation approach is used, the problem is essentially insolvable- for it assumes conditions that do not exist. The result is
"built in" uncertainty, controversy and litigation.
The solution then is to cut the Gordian knot - to recognize, for example, that the public school system is in some of its aspects and in
some contexts both local and super-local. This entails (1) making the
powers of the state and city concurrent, (2) outlawing all special
legislation in the municipal field, and (3) recognizing that in case of
conflict, general state legislation shall take precedence over local
charters and ordinances. Item (1) faces reality by recognizing that
there is no sharp demarcation line between city and state affairs and
thus eliminates the basic cause of home rule failures. Item (2) takes
account of the historical fact that it is special legislation that has been
the curse of municipal government. All too often such legislation in
fact is not legislation by the state legislature. It is in practice simply
the dictate of one or a handful of legislators from a particular city. As
such, of course, it circumvents the inherent, democratic safeguard
against unwise legislation. "What happens," as Dean Fordham has
observed, "is casual, unstudied enactment of almost any local measure
11. Quoted in KNMa, op cit. supra note 2, at 101.
12. State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co., 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W.
41, 44 (1905) (concurring opinion).
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if sought or approved by the representatives from the district concerned. At the 1947 regular session of the General Assembly of Tennessee the process reached the nadir of legislative irresponsibility.
Local bills were passed in blocs.
The following is quoted from the Nashville Tennessean for February
22, 1947:
'In the House, [the] Speaker... and Chief Clerk... were more interested in actual experiments with speed up devices than in ascertaining membership attitudes toward speed up plans.
'Passage of local bills traditionally has been an abbreviated procedure. But nobody ever kicks. The process calls for the clerk to
mumble the first five names on the roll call and then sing out "65 ayes
and no noes." This is done for each local bill.
'Friday [the Speaker and Chief Clerk] tried the same procedure on
whole blocks of bills. It worked. There were no kicks.' "'
Finally, item (3) recognizes the historical fact that general legislation has not been a serious danger to legitimate city interests; that
the requirement of generality provides inherent safeguards against
legislative abuses; and that inevitably in case of real difference of
opinion between state and city on any specific matter the former must
and will prevail. Home rule does not mean anarchy." It recognizes
that in matters affecting the general welfare of the state the part must
yield to the whole. In case of disagreement as to what is local and what
is of state-wide importance, certainly a local view must give way when
most citizens of the state, acting through their responsible representatives at the state capitol, are in agreement upon the need for uniform,
general state action. To hold otherwise is to deny the basic democratic premise that in community affairs the views of the many shall
prevail over the views of the few.
The following proposed constitutional provisions are offered as embodying the foregoing principles:"5
SEcTION 4: Subject only to the Declaration of Rights, the provisions of this
Article,1 the provisions of its charter and general laws of the state which
[do not deal with matters of purely or essentially local concern and which]
in terms and effect apply alike to all municipalities, each municipality shall
13. FORDHAM, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW 75 (1949).
14. "Every constitutional amendment granting home rule powers to cities
contains some saving clause, some words to insure the continued dominance
of the state legislature in matters of state interest." McDONALD, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 78-79.
15. These sections are numbered to follow in consecutive order the sections
proposed in Part I, above, dealing with the adoption and amendment of charters.
16. Some or all of the other provisions of the state constitution might be
added here. In its present form Section 4 imposes upon municipalities only civil
liberty restraints and such others as may be provided by existing or future
general legislation of the state (dealing with matters that are not of purely or
essentially local concern). Of course, both states and municipalities are subject to the restrictions of the Constitution of the United States.
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have full power to tax, regulate and otherwise govern within its territorial
jurisdiction; and both within and beyond its territorial jurisdiction to borrow
money and acquire real or personal property by condemnation or otherwise
for community welfare purposes, and to dispose thereof.
For purposes of zoning and other regulations of land use the term "territorial jurisdiction" as used in this section includes all areas within five miles
beyond each municipality's corporate limits in the case of municipalities of
less than 25,000 inhabitants, and ten miles in the case of larger municipalities,
excepting any area within the corporate limits of another municipality. Where
there is not enough distance between two municipalities to give each the full
zoning area to which it would otherwise be entitled, the zoning power of each
shall extend to a point midway between the two.
SECTION 5: Any municipal charter, ordinance or regulation adopted pursuant to the terms of this Article shall supersede any conflicting special legislation of the state. The state shall not hereafter enact any special legislation
with respect to any municipality or any matter within the territorial jurisdiction of any municipality [nor any legislation whatsoever dealing with matters
of purely or essentially local concern.]

SEcTION 6: No state legislation [dealing with municipal salaries and wages]
that would directly and substantially increase the fiscal burdens of any municipality shall become effective in such municipality until approved by the
legislative body thereof. But nothing in this Article shall be deemed to restrict the power of the state to give fiscal aid to municipalities for the purpose
of improving their facilities or services.
The geographical restriction that Section 4 imposes on the governmental power of cities is nothing more than the territorial limitation
that applies to all governments. In short except for zoning purposes
the concurrent power of the city under this provision runs only to the
city limits, just as national competence runs only to the nation's boundaries. The zoning power has been extended further to enable cities
to protect themselves from strangulation by conditions over which
they would otherwise have no control short of annexation. It would
ease municipal growing pains by providing the foundation for orderly,
planned expansion. Too many of our cities are now paying an unconscionable price for having in the past "just growed."
But, it will be noted, Section 4 puts welfare rather than territorial
limitations upon a city's proprietary powers, because, for example,
cities often need outside property for such things as water and sewage
systems. This, of course, means that under Section 4 municipal proprietary power would be subject to a qualitative limitation ("community welfare"). This is in effect a return to the old demarcation
approach. Clearly such a limitation is much less objective than the
territorial type and thus more susceptible to judicial "manipulation"
or misunderstanding. But, if cities are to have at least some authority
outside of their boundaries, this seems to be the most effective way to
provide for it.
Section 4 imposes two limitations upon the power of the state to
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enact general legislation. The first, confining general legislation to
matters of more than "purely or essentially local concern" is optional
and would not appear in a strictly concurrent power system. But it
might be included to throw weight on the side of municipal freedom.
Such a limitation, of course, would invite judicial interpretation, but
only in case of attacks upon state laws deemed unduly to impinge upon
local affairs and not vice versa. For the territorial restriction is the only

corresponding limit on city governmental powers."
The second restraint on the general legislative powers of the state
imposes the requirement that laws must "in terms and effect apply
alike to all municipalities." This clause comes from the New York
Constitution18 and has been construed by Chief Judge Cardozo in a
leading case"8 to mean that classification of cities for legislative purposes is permissible, but only if it is not in fact a subterfuge for
special legislation:
"We are no longer confined to the inquiry whether an act is general or local
'in its terms'. We must go farther and inquire whether it is general or local
'in its effect' .... If the class in its formation is so unnatural and wayward

that only by the rarest coincidence can the range of its extension include more
than one locality, and at best but two or three, the act so hedged and circumscribed is local [i.e., special] in effect. If the same limits are apparent upon
the face of the act, unaided by extrinsic evidence, or are so notorious or obvious as to be the subject of judicial notice, it is also local [i.e., not general]
in its terms.
"The statute now before us cannot survive these tests. All the stigmata of
arbitrary selection, of forced and unnatural classification, appear upon its
face. By its terms a new burden
has been laid, despite its pretense of generality,
' 20
but upon one city or a few.

These limited quotations hardly do Chief Judge Cardozo justice,
but a full reading of the opinion and a subsequent case" based thereon
makes it quite clear that under the clause in question special legislation disguised by classification is outlawed.2
The Section 5 restriction upon all legislation, general or special,
"of purely or essentially local concern" is optional, being merely a
negative counterpart of the same restraint that appears in Section 4.
The "fiscal burden" restriction in Section 6 is designed to put a
check upon state legislators who (often at the instance of pressure
17.
18.
19.
20.

See note 16 supra.
Formerly, Art. XII, § 2; now Art. IX, § 11.
In re Elm Street in the City of New York, 246 N.Y. 72, 158 N.E. 24 (1927).
Id. at 25-26.

21. Osborn v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 55, 4 N.E.2d 289 (1936).

22. A state that adopts a law of another state is deemed to adopt also the
adoptee state's judicial construction thereof. See Part II, D, below. If it should
seem desirable to limit general legislative powers even further, Section 4 might
be expanded to include a clause that would prohibit all forms of classification
except that based on population and/or a proviso to the effect that no law applicable to a class which includes less than four municipalities shall become
operative in a municipality until approved by the legislative body thereof.
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groups) find it easy to vote "improvements" which not they, but city
councils, will have to find a way to finance. This restriction, of course,
would not imperial state financed improvements. It would mean simply that, if the state legislature wanted to require higher standards
than municipalities saw fit to provide, the state would have to pay for
them either wholly or by a grant-in-aid system.
But such a provision entails a serious danger. It might encourage
cities to hold back needed improvements in the hope that the state
would thus be compelled to provide them. We certainly should not
encourage local communities to lag behind the times. Indeed it is precisely their failure to keep up with modern developments that has
brought about a good part of the present state "interference" in local
affairs.
B.

The Model State Constitution Approach

For those who prefer the demarcation line approach, the Model State
Constitution of the National Municipal League provides an excellent
solution. "- Drawing upon experience in all home rule states over a long
period of years, the League has devised the following composite of
what it considers the most desirable features of a number of different
state constitutions:
SECTION 4: Each municipality is hereby granted full power and authority
to pass laws and ordinances relating to its local affairs, property and government; and no enumeration of powers in this constitution shall be deemed to
limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant
of authority shall not be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature to enact laws of state-wide concern uniformly applicable to every
municipality.
The following shall be deemed to be a part of the powers conferred upon
municipalities by this Section when not inconsistent with general law:
(a) To adopt and enforce within their limits local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations.
(b) To levy, assess and collect taxes, and to borrow money and issue bonds,
and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits conferred.
(c) To furnish all local public services; and to acquire and maintain, either
within or without its corporate limits, cemeteries, hospitals, infirmaries, parks,
and boulevards, water supplies, and all works which involve the public health
and safety.
(d) To maintain art institutes, museums, theatres, operas, or orchestras, and
to make any other provision for the cultural needs of the residents.
(e) To establish and alter the location of streets, to make local public improvements, and to acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, property within its
corporate limits necessary for such improvements, and also to acquire additional property in order to preserve and protect such improvements, and to
23. THE COMMITTEE ON STATE GOVERNMENT
LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 16 (1948).

or THE NATIONAL

MUNICIPAL
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lease or sell such additional property, with restrictions to preserve and protect
the improvements.
(f) To acquire, construct, hire, maintain and operate or lease local public
utilities; to acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions
imposed by general law for the protection of other communities; and to grant
local public utility franchises and regulate the exercise thereof.
(g) To issue and sell bonds, outside of any general debt limit imposed by
law, on the security in whole or in part of any public utility or property
owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or of both, including in the case
of a public utility, if deemed desirable by the city, a franchise stating the terms
upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such utility.
(h) To organize and administer public schools and libraries.
(i) To provide for slum clearance, the rehabilitation of blighted areas, and
safe and sanitary housing for families of low income, and for recreational
and other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto; and gifts of money or
property, or loans of money or credit for such purposes, shall be deemed to be
for a city purpose.2
It will be noted that this proposal begins with a division of power
predicated on a distinction between "local affairs, property and government" and affairs "of state-wide concern."
Then, as Arthur Bromage observes, it faces the problem of possible
unfriendly judicial interpretation "by specifically enumerating large
segments of municipal authority .... Further definition of municipal
authority over local affairs, property and government depends, of
course, on the legislature and the courts. In this way [Section 4] avoids
the broad grant without any enumeration and also avoids constitutional language leaving the determination of municipal powers entirely
to the vagaries of legislative action.
"When all is said and done, it must be recognized that the ultimate
success of the home rule section of the Model State Constitution, like
many of the home rule articles now in existence among the states,
rests upon a wiser and broader sweep of judicial interpretation."2 ' If
Mr. Bromage is right in suggesting that judicial interpretation is home
rule's greatest danger, then clearly there is more risk involved in the
model than in the concurrent power proposal. For, in addition to the
dangers which Mr. Bromage admits, the special enumeration of local
powers in sub-sections (a) to (i) itself presents problems of, or at
least is susceptible to unfriendly, interpretation. The purely concurrent power approach undertakes to remove allocation entirely from
judicial hands. But it would leave to the courts - in addition to their
jurisdiction with respect to conflicts between local and state law - the
problem of enforcing the constitutional prohibition upon special legislation with respect to cities and upon attempts at evasion via specious
24. This section is numbered to follow in consecutive order the sections proposed in Part I, above, dealing with the adoption and amendment of, charters.
25. MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, su2pra note 22, at 47.
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classification. And, of course, if the optional restraints upon state
powers are used, the courts would have something to say about the
scope of state power - thus giving home rule a second line of defense.
It should be noted that the Model Constitution adopts the Wisconsin
Constitution's treatment of the classification problem - home rule
powers with respect to local matters "shall not be deemed to limit or
restrict the power of the legislature to enact laws of state-wide concern
uniformly applicable to every municipality." This has been held by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to mean that:
"If in dealing with the local affairs of a city the Legislature classifies cities
so that the act does not apply with uniformity to every city, that act is subordinate to a charter ordinance relating to the same matter .... When the Legislature deals with matters which are primarily matters of state-wide concern,
it may deal with them free from any restriction contained in the home rule
amendment.... The power of the Legislature to classify cities when it deals
with local affairs of a city is impaired by the amendment. Its power to classify
cities when it deals with matters of state-wide concern which are not also local
affairs is unimpaired." 2
C.

The Leave-it-to-the-Courts Approach

As indicated above the concensus of informed opinion is that judicial
efforts to determine the boundary between state and local affairs has
not in practice been conducive to effective home rule. Still there are
some who, all things considered, may prefer the judicial to the political
processes for the solution of such problems. This attitude is the more
appealing because it leaves final decision to the typically most conservative branch of the state government and the branch least likely
to be encumbered with "politics." Certainly, passing thorny political
bucks to the judiciary for solution is a deeply ingrained tradition in this
country. Indeed, this is exactly what has been done, consciously or
unconsciously, in those home rule constitutions which purport to allocate powers between state and city by the use of ambiguous phrases
which in the nature of things can have no intrinsic meaning. To authorize municipalities, for example, to regulate all "local," or "municipal" affairs is in effect to delegate policy making power to the courts
-to
give them a form of administrativepower to decide issues which
for one reason or another the constitutional convention itself found it
inexpedient to decide. Those who consider such "judicial home rule"
desirable might obtain it by a constitutional provision in the following
terms: 2'
26. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25, 35-36, aff'd on
rehearing, 222 Wis. 58, 268 N.W. 108, 105 A.L.R. 244 (1936). See also Martin v.
City of Juneau, 238 Wis. 564., 300 N.W. 187 (1941); Barth v. Village of Shorewood, 229 Wis. 151, 282 N.W. 89 (1938).

27. This section is numbered to follow in consecutive order the sections proposed in Part I, above, dealing with the adoption and amendment of charters.
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SECTION 4: Each municipality is hereby granted full power and authority
to regulate its own local affairs subject only to the provisions of this Constitution and the general [and special] laws of the state.

But as experience and Mr. McGoldrick have shown, "our judges are
no better qualified to establish the rules of the relationship of munici-

palities to the state than are our legislators, unless we deem them men
of greater sense and experience. This must be quite apart from their
legal training per se, which would, if anything, unfit them for the task.
Secondly, the judicial process has rather less to commend it for the
solution of municipal problems than the legislative process. The former is deeply concerned with precedent and overly interested in analysis. The latter admits of practical discussion by laymen conversant
with the problem and is free to consider the widest possible implications of the policy to be decided upon. The judicial process is not only
cumbersome, costly and slow, but it produces a scant product. Legislation permits a more complete and thorough job and permits matters
to be considered in relation to a coordinated programme. Lastly, the
judicial decision is all but riveted into the constitution which it interprets. Judicial mis-steps are not easy to retrace. They are likely to
lead to further wandering before they return to the path of wisdom.
Legislative errors are far more readily retrieved."'" Moreover, "judicial home rule" may be and has been unsatisfactory from the courts'
point of view. For it has a tendency to involve them in political controversies and thus weaken their effectiveness in more clearly judicial
work.
D.

The Adopted System Approach

A well-know and generally recognized canon of construction is that,
"When provisions have been adopted into the constitution of the state,
which are identical with or similar to those of other states, it will be presumed
that the framers of such constitution were conversant with, and designed to
adopt also, any
construction previously placed on such provisions in such
20-

other states.

This means that by adopting the constitutional provisions under
which home rule has flourished in another state, the adopting state in
effect - if the contrary is not indicated - adopts also the other state's
past judicial interpretations of those provisions. The problem then is
reduced to one of drawing in full measure upon the constitutional
language of a state whose experience is deemed satisfactory. Tastes
vary"' and there are about a score of different home rule systems to
choose from, plus hundreds of interpretative court decisions. We will
not here attempt the detailed analysis that would be required to make
28. MCGOLDRICK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 311-12.
29. 12 C.J., ConstitutionalLaw § 70 (1917). See also 16 C.J.S., Constitutional
Law § 34 (1939).
30. Compare FORDHAM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 78.
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an intelligent choice as between the existing systems. But it will be
appropriate to mention some of the problems which the adoption approach presents.
Assuming, as we reasonably may, that the courts of the adopting
state will honor the above mentioned canon of construction, it is possible that in some cases they will find that conditions in their state
are sufficiently "different" to justify ignoring the outside precedents.
Also it is just possible that upon some issues there will be no outside
interpretative decisions to draw upon. Probably these difficulties are
not in themselves sufficiently serious to be considered as substantial
objections. In any case, they may be anticipated and circumvented by
appropriate constitutional language after careful examination of the
relevant decisions before adopting any particular home rule scheme
from a sister state.
But a serious objection to the adoption approach is that laymen, i.e.,
the voting public, cannot reasonably be expected to know and understand a multitude of court decisions of the state whose system they are
asked to adopt. Thus, in effect, they will have to vote their approval
or disapproval in the dark, or on the basis of someone's interpretation
of the relevant judicial interpretations. This is hardly consonant with
the ideals of democracy.
E. The Illinois Plan
The extremely difficult relationship between the metropolis of Chicago and the state of fliinois has resulted in a provision that no special
state law with respect to Chicago can become effective until approved
at the polls by the voters of that city. Such a negative approach certainly is not genuine home rule, but it does help to eliminate some of
the abuses of the old system. This device could be expanded for more
general use in other situations as indeed it was for a time in Michigan
and New York before they obtained real local self-government."1
Under an expanded Illinois plan the state would retain its customary
power to enact general and special legislation concerning municipalities but no special law would go into effect until it had been approved
by the voters (or the city council) of the community involved. This
device might be used alone or in conjunction with more orthodox,
positive home rule provisions.
Negative home rule of this type might be obtained through a constitutional provision in the following terms:
No special or local law, enactment or provision of this state shall become
effective with respect to any municipality or any matter of municipal interest
unless approved by resolution of the legislative body of the municipality concerned, but nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the power of the legislature
to enact general laws uniformly applicable to all municipalities.2
31. McDonALD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 87.
32. See paragraphs 10 and 11, Art. IV, § 7 of the New Jersey Constitution of
1947.

